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management metrics can be explained by firms' performance trajectories. We test our 
proposition using dividend change as a natural setting that distinguishes high from low 
performance trajectory firms. Consistent with our proposition, we find that standard 
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unexpected earnings at which firms' earnings management activities are supposedly 
targeted. Additionally, we find that firms with higher values of earnings management 
metrics, i.e., firms that appear to manage earnings to a greater extent, are more likely to 
increase their dividends; and standard earnings management metrics are unimportant in 
explaining changes in firm value around dividend change announcements. These results 
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Opportunistic earnings management or performance-related effects? 
Evidence from dividend-paying firms 
 
1. Introduction 
We propose that studies that fail to fully consider how performance trajectory 
(multiperiod performance) affects firms' activities will identify deviations of discretionary 
accruals and real activities from subindustry averages as opportunistic too frequently. Using 
dividend change as a natural setting that distinguishes high from low performance trajectory 
firms, we show that much of the variation in real activities can be explained by firms' 
performance trajectories. Previous research has found a positive correlation between earnings 
management and past performance (Kothari, Leone and Wasley, 2005; Hribar and Nichols, 
2007; and Cohen, Pandit, Wasley and Zach, 2016). We extend these findings and show that 
earnings management metrics are more closely related to firm performance trajectory than the 
unexpected earnings at which firms' smoothing activities are supposedly targeted.1 
Dividend-paying firms make a joint decision to smooth their earnings and dividends as 
they pursue complementary objectives. These include meeting their earnings and dividend per 
share targets while also capturing the positive valuation effects associated with reporting 
smoother earnings and dividends over time (Daniel, Denis and Naveen, 2008; Liu and 
Espahbodi, 2014). For example, more persistent, low-volatility earnings are viewed as higher 
quality based on their superior informativeness and predictability (Dechow, Weili and Schrand, 
2010). Companies reporting smoother earnings also have lower costs of equity and debt capital 
                                               
1 Collins, Pungaliya and Vijh (2016) control for a firm’s forward-looking growth (e.g., market-to-book ratio, four-
quarter ahead sales growth, and analysts’ consensus forecast of long-term earnings growth) when estimating 
abnormal accruals in a quarterly setting. Rather than revising the models to estimate abnormal accruals/real-activity 
earnings management, which assumes that specific variables such as market-to-book ratio are the relevant omitted 
variables, we focus on a specific corporate event (i.e., dividend changes) in which expected future performance 
alone may drive conventional measures of earnings management. We realize that our results do not allow us to 
completely rule out opportunistic earnings management. However, they clearly reveal problems with the standard 
earnings management metrics even when past performance is included in the expectation models. 
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(Francis, LaFond, Olsson and Schipper, 2004 and 2005). These attributes support higher firm 
valuation. Changes in dividend levels are also positively related to firm profitability and value, 
and companies with smoother dividend streams are considered to have higher quality, more 
informative earnings (Skinner and Soltes, 2011).  
Additionally, earnings management is usually measured as a single-period activity, 
despite survey evidence that indicates managers smooth both earnings and dividends across 
fiscal periods (Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal, 2005 and Brav, Graham, Harvey and Michaely, 
2005). CFO survey responses indicate most inter-period smoothing is accomplished by delaying 
or accelerating real activities, instead of via year-end adjustments to accrual accounts, which is 
the focus of much of the earnings management literature (Dichev, Graham, Harvey and 
Rajgopal, 2013). Firms also make comparable tradeoffs as they strive to meet or beat the levels 
of EPS and DPS expected by investors. Companies postpone investments in value-increasing 
projects, lay off employees, sell assets, borrow heavily, and decrease spending on advertising, 
maintenance, and research and development to meet their EPS and DPS goals (Graham, et al. 
2005 and Brav et al., 2005). These findings suggest that earnings and dividend smoothing are 
complementary multiperiod activities that are related to firm performance trajectory. 
Prior research proposes that taking a multiperiod, performance-based perspective will 
lead to alternative interpretations of firms' earnings management activities (Dechow, et al., 
2010). Moreover, standard measures of earnings management may not be sufficiently subtle to 
identify accounting practices that support multiple objectives, such as meeting EPS and DPS 
targets while reporting smooth streams of earnings and dividends over time. This idea is well-
expressed by one CFO's response to a Dichev, et al. (2013) survey question: "… distinguishing 
between business-driven economic reasons to cut spending vs. opportunistic cuts aimed at hitting 
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earnings targets is difficult for an outside analyst" (p. 29). We argue that if professional analysts 
find it difficult to draw such distinctions, models based mainly on deviations from subindustry 
averages will confound performance-driven accounting activities with evidence of opportunistic 
earnings management, particularly when there are substantial differences in performance across 
companies. 
Before testing our formal hypotheses, we establish that dividend changes reflect 
information regarding firm performance trajectory. For each dividend announcement event, we 
sort our sample of firms into three groups based on the percentage change in dividends 
(decreasers, small increasers and large increasers), rather than one of the earnings-based 
performance metrics used in previous research, such as pre-managed earnings changes (e.g., 
Daniel et al., 2008 and Liu and Espahbodi, 2014). We find that firms announcing the most 
positive (negative) percentage change in dividends at time zero are on the highest (lowest) 
performance trajectory (spanning years −3 to +3 relative to the announcement), as evidenced by 
faster (slower) growth in revenues, profits, dividends, cash flows, capital expenditures (CAPEX), 
and selling and administrative expenses (SG&A). These findings are consistent with the idea that 
dividend changes are valid multiperiod performance signals. 
Following from our finding that dividend changes are valid multiperiod performance 
signals, the remainder of this study focuses on testing three hypotheses (developed in the 
following section) regarding the earnings management of dividend-paying firms. Our first two 
hypotheses test whether standard earnings management metrics are significantly related to firm 
performance trajectory, measured as the percentage change in a firm's annual dividends. Our 
third hypothesis follows from signaling theory predictions that dividend changes provide 
  4 
investors with information regarding firm value, and tests our proposition that firms' 
performance goals take precedence over their earnings management activities. 
We test our first hypothesis by investigating the key drivers of earnings management for 
dividend-paying firms. We model various real and accruals-based earnings management metrics 
as a function of firms' most recent dividend change and earnings surprise. We control for factors 
thought to affect firms' incentives to manage earnings and for differences in the life-cycle and 
financial characteristics of dividend-paying firms. The results show that conventional measures 
of earnings management have a stronger statistical relation with dividend changes than with 
unexpected earnings, which is consistent with the idea that earnings management metrics reveal 
more information about firm performance trajectory than about active attempts to manage 
earnings.  
We test our second hypothesis by modeling the probability that a firm will increase its 
dividend, controlling for the same life-cycle and financial factors as in the earnings management 
regressions described above. We find that the probability that a firm increases its dividends 
increases with the extent of upward real earnings management. We also find that firms that have 
higher growth in capital expenditures — which would be expected from firms on high-
performance trajectories — are more likely to increase their dividends. These findings provide 
further support for the idea that standard earnings management metrics reflect information about 
companies' performance trajectory and their ability to increase (or need to decrease) dividends.  
Finally, to test our third hypothesis, we investigate the relation between dividend changes 
and standard earnings management metrics and firm value. Specifically, we regress the 3-day 
excess return around the dividend change announcement on the percentage change in dividends 
per share, various measures of earnings management, and life-cycle and financial characteristic 
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control variables. We find that the percentage change in dividends is significantly related to the 
announcement period return, with all the earnings management metrics being insignificant. In 
addition to confirming the well-established view that changes in dividends convey information to 
investors, we find that the activities used to smooth earnings and dividends, typically classified 
as earnings management, have no effect on firm value after controlling for the degree to which 
dividend-paying firms are able (or find it necessary) to change their dividend level. These results 
suggest investors focus more on firm performance than the smoothing activities that contributed 
to the firm's ability (or necessity) to change the dividend. 
Our study makes several contributions to the literature, both conceptual and empirical. 
We identify similarities between the classic explanations for earnings and dividends, especially 
those related to cash flow signaling and agency issues, and use these to motivate our study. We 
show how taking a multiperiod perspective suggests that firm performance trajectory influences 
standard earnings management metrics, and introduce alternative interpretations of these metrics. 
We also present empirical evidence consistent with the ideas that: (1) standard measures of 
earnings management are more closely related to dividend changes than unexpected earnings, 
and thus reflect information regarding multiperiod firm performance; (2) although firms that 
change their dividend level by larger amounts appear to manage earnings to a greater extent, it is 
more plausible that much of the differences in earnings management metrics are driven by 
differences in firm performance trajectory; and (3) dividend change announcements convey more 
value-relevant information to investors than firms' apparent earnings management activities. 
Additionally, our results confirm the validity of the suggestions of Dechow, et al. (2010) that 
analyzing firms' earnings management from a multiperiod, performance-based perspective would 
yield additional insights regarding the relation between earnings management and earnings 
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quality. Our findings are also consistent with recent research that shows accruals earnings 
management among dividend-paying firms may be less prevalent than previously thought. For 
example, He, Ng, Zaiats and Zhang (2017) find that dividend-paying firms are less likely to 
engage in accruals-based earnings management than non-payers, and Kim, Lee and Lie (2017) 
find that firms facing dividend constraints are more likely to reduce dividends than manage 
earnings to avoid dividend cuts. A promising direction for future research would be investigating 
if the relation between firm performance trajectory and standard earnings management metrics 
generalizes to all firms, including those that do not pay dividends.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents our review of the 
relevant literature and hypotheses; section 3 discusses our data sources and methodology; section 
4 presents our empirical results; and section 5 contains our summary and conclusions.  
2. Literature Review, Motivation and Hypotheses 
We identify various factors that contribute to the prevalence of earnings management 
being overstated in the academic literature. Among these are the dual imperatives to report 
smooth streams of high quality earnings over time while adhering to the principle of faithful 
representation; the tendency to measure earnings management as a single-period activity; and the 
failure to fully account for performance when measuring firms' earnings management activities. 
We also identify similarities between the classic explanations for earnings and dividends, 
especially those related to cash flow signaling and agency issues, and use these to motivate the 
idea that, for dividend-paying firms, earnings and dividend smoothing are interrelated 
multiperiod activities. Finally, we show how taking a multiperiod perspective suggests that 
firms’ performance trajectories influence standard earnings management metrics, and introduce 
alternative interpretations of these metrics that lead to our hypotheses. 
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2.1 Faithful representation, Earnings Quality, and the Equilibrium Level of Earnings 
Management 
Markets prize smoother earnings and consider them to be higher quality, as less volatile 
earnings stream are more informative and predictable. While earnings "smoothing" refers to the 
minor adjustments managers make to enhance the informativeness and predictability of reported 
profits, other related terms are earnings “management” and "manipulation," which connote 
deliberately misstating earnings to misinform users. A large body of academic literature focuses 
on concerns that earnings management is pervasive and frequently implemented to misrepresent 
profits, based on the implicit assumption that almost all firms are managing to report higher 
earnings, rather than achieving smooth earnings as an outcome of a properly-applied accrual 
system (Dechow, et al., 2010). This is contrary to Dichev, et al. (2013) finding that 
approximately 40 percent of earnings management activity is deliberately income-decreasing.2  
If the main goal is to report high-quality earnings, accountants' efforts to create financial 
statements that are more "decision-useful" (which is facilitated by smoother, less volatile 
earnings) naturally lead to some non-zero level of earnings management.3 On the other hand, the 
principle of faithful representation requires strict adherence to recording transactions in a way 
that depicts their true economic substance. From this perspective, many aberrations from 
accounting rules appear to be not just earnings smoothing but outright management, which 
                                               
2 Liu and Espahbodi (2014) also find that, on average, dividend-paying firms with positive pre-managed earnings 
changes manage earnings downward. 
3 A related line of research suggests that managers may engage in both accruals and real earnings management 
activities to convey management private information about firms’ superior future performance and signaling firm 
value via examining the subsequent operating and market performance of firms identified to be engaged in either 
accruals or real earnings management activities. For example, research by Sankar and Subramanyam (2001) and 
Perotti and Windisch (2017) suggests that firms may manage earnings to communicate favorable private information 
about their future performance. Firms engaging in real earnings management activities demonstrate superior 
operating and stock performance than those that do not engage in such activities (Gunny, 2010). It should be noted 
that this line of research assumes that standards measures of earnings management accurately identifies companies 
that manage earnings. 
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carries the negative connotation that these choices are designed to misstate profitability and/or 
confound investors' perceptions regarding the market value of the firm. 
We argue that the competing imperatives of faithful representation and earnings quality 
often induce the appearance of earnings management. The earnings management literature 
identifies a multiperiod reversal in smoothing activities as high levels of earnings management in 
one period naturally lead to reversals in subsequent periods. For example, previous studies 
describe how financially distressed firms take "big baths" (report as much bad news in one fiscal 
period as possible) and financially successful firms use discretionary activities to fund "cookie 
jars" for future periods (e.g., Healy and Wahlen, 1999 and Kirschenheiter and Melumad, 2002). 
The key issue is whether the reversal in smoothing activities is mainly a natural outcome 
of accrual accounting or opportunistic earnings management. Hansen (1996) examines the time-
series properties of discretionary accruals using five different models and finds no evidence of 
managerial opportunism. Other researchers employ modeling assumptions that lead to the 
conclusion that managers' incentives to manipulate earnings are contracted away in equilibrium 
(e.g., DeMarzo and Fishman, 2007 and Edmans, 2009). The results of these studies suggest the 
equilibrium level of earnings management may be close to zero. 
Another stream of research asserts that a nonzero level of earnings management is 
inevitable in a practical world concerned with factors that affect firm value, including reporting 
smooth, high quality streams of earnings over time. In particular, the incentive compensation of 
CEOs and CFOs and the duration of CEO tenure have been identified as factors affecting firms' 
earnings management activities (Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006; Jiang, Petroni and Wang, 
2010; Ali and Zhang, 2015). Dutta and Fan (2014) further examine the relation between 
managerial incentives and earnings management. They model earnings management as a 
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naturally-arising phenomenon on an equilibrium path that leads to the "highest quality" 
accounting statements firms can produce. The managerial compensation contract that maximizes 
firm value results in some earnings management. These findings were anticipated by Dye (1988): 
". . . if shareholders wish managers to exert some nontrivial effort level, they must tolerate some 
earnings management" [p. 200]. Crocker and Slemrod (2007) also conclude that ". . . contracts 
contingent on reported earnings cannot provide managers with the incentive both to maximize 
profits and to report those profits honestly. As a result, some degree of earnings management 
must be tolerated" [p. 698]. 
Fischer and Verrecchia (2000) note that the costs of manipulating reported earnings can 
include "… the manager’s litigation risks, psychic costs, or reputation costs of biasing a report" 
[p. 232]. Dutta and Fan (2014) assume that these costs are borne by managers, which places a 
natural limit on reporting discretion. Another key assumption of the Dutta and Fan (2014) model 
is that the manager faces a dynamic multiperiod restriction: the manipulation of earnings 
reverses over time by the natural operation of the accounting system, which also mitigates the 
tendency to manipulate reported earnings. The upshot of these studies is that the expected level 
of earnings management is greater than zero. 
2.2 Agency Explanations for Managing Earnings and Dividends 
Guay, Kothari and Watts (1996) identify a variety of motivations for managing or 
smoothing earnings. Their "opportunistic accrual management hypothesis" proposes that 
earnings management can be a symptom of agency problems in the firm. Under this view, 
managers' private information regarding the true level of the firm's earnings is not revealed to 
shareholders. Misalignment of managers' and shareholders' incentives can result in managers 
using the flexibility provided by GAAP to manage income opportunistically, thereby creating 
  10 
distortions in reported profits (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; Healy and Palepu, 1993.) This 
perspective is more closely related to the idea that earnings management occurs to misrepresent 
firm profitability and performance. 
Researchers have proposed that dividend policy is also related to agency issues in a 
variety of ways. Easterbrook (1984) argues that regular dividend payments help investors 
monitor managerial behavior, as companies paying cash dividends must access capital markets 
more frequently to fund new investments than firms without regular payouts. Jensen (1986) 
builds on Easterbrook's arguments by asserting dividends increase the value of mature firms that 
generate large cash flows because they limit managers' tendency to waste excess capital on low-
return investments. Siegel (2002) expands this line of thought by suggesting that historically high 
payouts helped limit accounting fraud as investors demanded "concrete evidence of real 
earnings" [p. A20] via regular dividend payments. He, et al. (2017) propose that dividend-paying 
firms engage in less accrual earnings management to mitigate agency concerns. The idea that 
dividends can mitigate potential agency concerns regarding misrepresented earnings (as 
identified by Guay, et al. 1996) complements the Skinner and Soltes (2011) view that dividend-
paying firms have higher quality, more informative earnings. 
2.3 Smoother Streams of Earnings and Dividends are More Informative 
Guay, et. al (1996) also identify information-based motivations for managing or 
smoothing earnings. The market (or performance-measure) hypothesis asserts that a privately-
informed manager seeks to influence investor perceptions of firm value. Under this hypothesis, a 
naturally-occurring conflict of interest between current shareholders and potential investors leads 
to a nonzero level of earnings management. The market hypothesis is consistent with the view 
that discretionary earnings smoothing enhances the informativeness and quality of earnings by 
communicating private information about firm profitability (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; 
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Holthausen, 1990; Healy and Palepu, 1993; Subramanyam, 1996; Hunt, Moyer and Shevlin, 
2000).  
Dividend policy is also thought to reveal information to investors. Linter's (1956) seminal 
model describes how managers partially smooth the permanent portion of recent earnings 
increases into the level of the firm's dividend. Subsequent research has proposed that dividend 
policy reflects information about the trend and sustainability of firms' past and current profits,4 
and may also signal managers' expectations of future earnings.5 Dividends serve as credible 
signals because rival firms with less positive prospects find it difficult to imitate a sustained 
dividend payout. Whether dividends provide signals of future profits, or their information content 
is more corroborative, confirming that recent earnings changes are permanent (as in Lintner, 
1956), the idea that dividend policy reveals information regarding firm profitability and value is 
consistent with the motivations for managing earnings described by Guay, et al. (1996). 
2.4 Firms Use Similar Methods to Smooth Earnings and Dividends 
Graham, et al. (2005) present survey evidence that reveals additional motivations for 
smoothing earnings and why these activities are so prevalent. CFOs believe that reporting 
smoother, less volatile earnings over time decreases the firm's cost of capital. Additionally, 
CFOs view earnings as the key metric considered by outsiders, and perceive a natural tradeoff 
between delivering expected earnings and investing in value-maximizing projects. While CFOs 
indicate they will sacrifice some economic value by adjusting the timing of real activities to meet 
earnings expectations, they are more reluctant to make small within-GAAP adjustments to 
                                               
4 Benartzi, Michaely and Thaler (1997), Dyl and Weigand (1998), Grullon, Michaely and Swaminathan (2002), 
Koch and Sun (2004), Grullon, Michaely, Benartzi and Thaler (2005), Fargher and Weigand (2009). 
5 Watts (1973), Bhattacharya, 1979, Gonedes (1978), Miller and Rock (1985), John and Williams (1985), Healy and 
Palepu (1988), Nissim and Ziv (2001). 
  12 
discretionary accrual accounts.6 It is well-known that firms also smooth dividends, and the 
earnings of dividend-paying firms are more persistent than those of non-payers.7 Skinner and 
Soltes (2011) conclude that the commitment to pay a dividend can help convince investors of the 
quality of reported earnings: "… dividends provide information about earnings quality, where 
high quality earnings are more likely to be sustainable in future periods" (p. 2). 
Firms make comparable tradeoffs to achieve smooth earnings and dividends. Up to 80 
percent of CFOs admit to laying off employees and decreasing spending on research and 
development, advertising and maintenance to meet an EPS benchmark, and 55 percent indicate 
that they have delayed investing in value-increasing projects (Graham, et al. 2005). Firms engage 
in similar activities to avoid reducing dividends, including selling assets, borrowing heavily and 
foregoing investment in positive NPV projects (Brav, et al. 2005). The earnings and dividend 
goals targeted by managers are also comparable. The imperative to report earnings and dividends 
per share that are at least equal to their levels from four quarters ago is particularly clear in 
CFOs' survey responses. 
The fact that managers are willing to postpone or forego a considerable level of real 
activity to achieve smooth earnings and dividends suggests that the valuation benefits of 
smoothing are significant. Dividend-paying firms are thought to engage in additional earnings 
                                               
6 Graham, et al. (2005) note that their findings contrast with the well-established premise that firms manage both 
real activities and accruals to meet or beat earnings benchmarks (Guay, et al., 1996; Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; 
Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser, 1999): "This evidence is somewhat disconcerting, considering the large volume of 
literature devoted to documenting earnings management via accruals and discretionary accruals" [p. 36]. The timing 
of the Graham, et al. (2005) survey, which was conducted immediately after passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, may 
partially explain why their findings differ from previous research. For example, Cohen, Dey and Lys (2008) report 
that real earnings management increased significantly following passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, with a proportional 
decline in accrual-based earnings management. 
7 Lintner (1956), Brav, et al. (2005), Leary and Michaely (2011), Skinner and Soltes (2011), Liu and Espahbodi 
(2014). 
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smoothing because firm value is positively related to the quality (smoothness, persistence and 
predictability) of firms' earnings and dividend streams.8 
2.5 Standard Earnings Management Metrics, Firm Performance and Hypotheses 
The literature discussed in the previous four subsections suggests that earnings 
management is pervasive; that while there is non-zero level of earnings management, earnings 
management is naturally self-correcting in most cases; that earnings management may enhance 
the quality and informativeness of earnings or be opportunistic; that there are variety of 
motivations to manage earnings; that dividend policy reveals information regarding firm 
profitability and value; and that firms make comparable tradeoffs to achieve smooth earnings and 
dividends. In general, the literature views earnings management as a single-objective, single-
period, opportunistic activity aimed at overstating income. This viewpoint as well as the use of 
standard measures of earnings management pose problems, and are partially recognized by prior 
research. For example, Ball and Shivakumar (2008) conclude that a bias exists toward 
identifying earnings management among IPO firms too frequently, and that this tendency also 
exists in "… a broad genre of studies on earnings management" [p. 346]. These authors show 
that some of this bias is due to methodologically inadequate controls for firm performance. We 
assert that dividend changes are a better measure of firm performance trajectory because 
dividends are not directly subject to earnings management,9 and changes in dividends reveal 
information about firm performance over multiple periods. 
Previous research has also found that standard measures of earnings management may 
not be sufficient to identify earnings management practices that support multiple objectives, such 
                                               
8 Venkatesh (1989), Dyl and Weigand (1998), Brav, et al. (2005), Daniel, et al. (2008), Skinner and Soltes (2011), 
Leary and Michaely (2011). 
9 For example, Kim, Lee, and Lie (2017) present evidence that earnings management to avoid cutting dividends is 
not as prevalent as reported in previous studies.  
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as meeting EPS and DPS targets while reporting smooth streams of earnings and dividends over 
time. Dichev, et al. (2013) support this view when they conclude that "CFOs believe that it is 
difficult for outside observers to unravel earnings management, especially when such earnings 
are managed using subtle unobservable choices or real actions" [p. 29]. In our view, if 
professional analysts find it difficult to draw such distinctions, models based mainly on 
deviations from subindustry averages may confound performance-driven practices with evidence 
of active earnings management, particularly when there are substantial differences in 
performance across companies. 
We argue that much of what appears to be unusual or abnormal levels of discretionary 
accruals and real activities may actually be evidence of cross-sectional dispersion in the 
performance trajectory of firms within their subindustry classifications. Finding that high 
performance firms have lower abnormal accruals is consistent with the explanation that these 
firms require less working capital because they have more efficient operations.10 Firms with high 
performance trajectories also have economic incentives to accelerate spending on CAPEX and 
SG&A due to their expectation that higher levels of long-term investment and spending will 
result in larger payoffs. Conversely, low performing firms hold more working capital (and thus 
have higher abnormal accruals) and have less economic incentive to increase spending on 
CAPEX and SG&A. Similarly, finding that high performing firms have higher abnormal real-
activities earnings management is consistent with the explanation that these firms are more 
efficient (i.e., they spend a smaller percentage of their sales on SG&A relative to their 
subindustries), again in line with their superior performance trajectories. 
                                               
10 Ball and Shivakumar (2008) document a similar bias when firms hold unusually high levels of working capital: 
"… using IPO proceeds for investing in working capital items … by definition causes positive accruals … and 
creates the appearance of earnings management" (p. 326). 
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The simultaneous targeting of specific EPS and DPS levels and similarity of the 
motivations guiding firms' earnings and dividend smoothing activities suggest three hypotheses. 
The first two hypotheses follow from our assertion that dividend increases are driven by stronger 
performance trajectory, and that for dividend-paying firms, conventional earnings management 
metrics reflect firm performance trajectory: 
H1. Standard measures of earnings management will be more closely related to 
multiperiod firm performance (measured as the percentage change in a firm's annual 
dividend) than with unexpected earnings. 
H2. Lower levels of discretionary accruals and higher levels of discretionary real 
activities (usually interpreted as signs of excessive earnings management) will be 
associated with a higher probability of increases in dividends (reflecting stronger 
multiperiod performance). 
Finding that earnings management metrics are related to dividend changes rather than earnings 
surprises and that firms engaging in an apparently greater degree of earnings management are 
more likely to increase their dividends supports our hypothesis that conventional earnings 
management metrics are influenced by firm performance trajectory. 
Our third hypothesis follows from signaling theory predictions that dividend changes 
provide investors with information regarding firm value, and tests our proposition that firms' 
performance goals take precedence over their earnings management activities: 
H3. Stock returns around dividend announcement dates will have a stronger relation with 
the dividend change performance signal than standard measures of earnings management. 
Finding that dividend changes convey more value-relevant information to investors than firms' 
apparent earnings management activities further supports our view that conventional earnings 
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management metrics reflect firm performance trajectory, and this information is more directly 
conveyed to investors via the dividend change announcement. 
3. Variables, Sample and Methodology 
Appendix A describes the variables used in this study. The variables include financial 
statement items, managerial compensation and institutional ownership data, dividends, stock 
returns, and analysts' forecasts of EPS. The sample consists of all publicly-traded firms in 
Compustat's ExecuComp database from 1994-2013 for which the following data are available: 
institutional ownership in the Wharton Research Data Services GMI database, dividends and 
stock returns in the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database, and analyst earnings 
forecasts in the I/B/E/S database. Consistent with prior literature, we omit firms in regulated 
industries and financial institutions (Roychowdhury 2006; Daniel et al. 2008; Skinner and Soltes, 
2011; Liu and Espahbodi, 2014; Cheng, Lee and Shevlin, 2016). To derive reliable estimates of 
the various earnings management metrics we also delete firm-years with less than eight 
observations in each two-digit SIC industry in each year (Cohen, Dey and Lys, 2008; Cohen and 
Zarowin, 2010; Liu and Espahbodi, 2014; Cheng, et al. 2016). Additionally, we control for 
outliers by deleting firm-years with compensation and institutional ownership at the extreme 99th 
percentile levels and all other variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles of their respective 
distributions (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Dechow, Kothari and Watts, 1998; Dechow, 
Richardson and Tuna, 2003). 
Our hypotheses require that we examine firm's earnings management activities around 
dividend change events. We therefore further restrict the sample to firms that have paid regular 
dividends on common stock in the current and prior year. These restrictions result in a sample of 
4,277 firm-years over the period 1994-2013, among which are 1,696 firm-years in which the 
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change in dividends equals zero. Thus, the final sample for testing our hypotheses includes 2,581 
firm-years (2,482 dividend increases and 99 dividend decreases). 
We use three earnings management metrics: abnormal accruals, abnormal discretionary 
expenditures, and abnormal production costs.11 Normal total accruals are estimated using the 
cross-sectional model of Jones (1991), controlling for financial performance as in Kothari, et al. 
(2005). Normal discretionary expenditures and normal production costs are estimated using 
models developed by Dechow, et al. (1998). These models are commonly used in the earnings 
management literature (e.g., see Roychowdhury 2006; Cohen et al. 2008; Cohen and Zarowin, 
2010; Liu and Espahbodi 2014; Cheng, et al. 2016). Specifically, we estimate the following 
regression models, shown as Equations 1-3, in which TA equals total accruals, defined as income 
before extraordinary items (IBEI) less cash flow from operations (CFO); PPE is property, plant, 
and equipment; SGA is selling, general and administrative expenses; and PROD is production 
costs, defined as the sum of cost of goods sold and change in inventory. Each regression is 
estimated separately for each two-digit SIC industry for every year: 
 
   (1) 
   (2) 
   (3) 
 
Abnormal total accruals (RACCR), abnormal discretionary expenditures and abnormal 
production costs (RPROD) are computed as the difference between their actual values and the 
                                               
11 We do not include abnormal cash flows since the net effect of earnings management activities on cash flows is 
ambiguous (Roychowdhury, 2006). 
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normal levels predicted; i.e., they are the residuals from models 1-3, respectively. Abnormal 
discretionary expenditures are multiplied by -1 (and denoted as RSG) so that a higher value in all 
cases indicates greater upward earnings management. We define real earnings management 
(REM) as the sum of RSG and RPROD. Note that Equation (1), which estimates normal total 
accruals, controls for firm past performance by including a term for return on assets as 
recommended by prior research (e.g., Kothari, et al., 2005; Hribar and Nichols, 2007) and 
implemented in many studies (e.g., Daniel, et al., 2008; Liu and Espahbodi, 2014).12 
We estimate model (4) below to test our first hypothesis regarding the relation between 
earnings management and firm performance trajectory. Specifically, we investigate whether 
measures of real and accruals-based earnings management are more closely related to multiperiod 
firm performance than earnings surprises, using the percentage change in dividends (% ch. Div) as 
the multiperiod performance signal: 
 
   (4) 
 
The earnings management metrics defined above as RACCR, RSG, RPROD and REM are 
the dependent variables in the regression models. Earnings Surprise equals actual annual EPS as 
reported by I/B/E/S minus the median of the most recent analysts' consensus forecast before the 
earnings release date divided by the absolute value of actual EPS. If the absolute value of EPS 
for a firm is less than the 10-percentile value for the year for all firms in the sample, the 10-
                                               
12 To test the sensitivity of our results, we add the return on assets to Equation (2) and Equation (3) as well. The 
results still indicate that dividend increasers manage earnings through real activities to a greater extent than dividend 
decreasers. We conjecture that two factors lead to this result: (1) return on assets is a measure of performance in a 
single period, and as such does not necessarily reflect performance trajectory; and (2) return on assets is based on 
reported earnings, which are affected by earnings management practices. 
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percentile value is used as the scalar.13 Change in CFO (cash flow from operations) and change 
in capital spending are percentage changes over the previous 12 months. Size is the natural 
logarithm of the market value of common equity at the beginning of the period. Lev is leverage, 
and is equal to total debt divided by total assets, both at the beginning of the period. COMP 
equals total current compensation other than salary as a percentage of total current compensation.  
COMP is included to control for compensation incentives (Bergstresser and Philippon, 
2006; Cohen et al. 2008; Jiang, Petroni and Wang, 2010). We include institutional ownership 
(INSTOWN) because institutions serve a monitoring function in corporate governance that can 
affect the degree of earnings management (Chen, Cheng, Lo and Wang 2015; Cheng, et al. 
2016). We include Change in CFO, Change in capital spending, firm size (SIZE), leverage 
(LEV), growth opportunities (M/B), and firm age (LN (age)) in the model because prior research 
has established that financial characteristics and the life-cycle stage of firms affect their dividend 
policy (e.g., Healy and Palepu, 1988; Grullon, et al. 2002; Skinner and Soltes, 2011). 
Our second hypothesis proposes that firms that appear to engage in more earnings 
management are stronger performers, and thus are more likely to increase their dividends. We 
test this hypothesis using the logistic regression model shown as Equation (5), which estimates 
the probability that a firm will increase its dividend as a function of earnings management 
metrics and earnings surprise, controlling for factors that influence management's incentives to 
manage earnings and for differences in the financial characteristics and life-cycle stage of 
dividend-paying firms. PAYCH is the dividend increaser dummy variable, which equals 1 if a 
firm increases its dividend in the current year, and 0 otherwise. Earnings Mngt. is the earnings 
                                               
13 A small value for the absolute value of actual earnings per share renders very large values for Earnings surprise. 
We thus change the scalar for small absolute values of actual earnings per share to a common value to avoid distorting 
measures of Earnings Surprise. 
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management metric: RACCR, RSG, RPROD and REM. All other variables are as previously 
defined: 
 
  (5) 
 
Our last hypothesis examines whether dividend change announcements convey more 
value-relevant information to investors than firms' apparent earnings management activities. We 
test this hypothesis using regression model depicted in Equation (6): 
 
  (6) 
 
CAR 3 is the three-day cumulative abnormal return around the dividend declaration date 
(from days −1 to +1) for each dividend change event. All other variables are as previously 
defined. A significant and positive coefficient on % ch. Div and an insignificant coefficient on 
Earnings Mngt. provides support for the idea that dividend change announcements convey more 
value-relevant information to investors than the apparent earnings management activities 
associated with firms' efforts to manage earnings and dividends and achieve their EPS and DPS 
targets. 
4. Empirical Results 
Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 1. Descriptors are presented for the full sample 
(Panel A), firms decreasing dividends (Panel B), and firms increasing dividends by percentage 
amounts that are smaller or larger than their subindustry medians (Panels C and D, respectively). 
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The percentage changes in dividends are substantially different for the three subsamples. The 
mean (median) dividend change equals −18.0% (−16.9%) for dividend decreasers, +2.0% 
(+1.8%) for small increasers, and +5.4% (+4.2%) for large increasers. The mean three-day 
cumulative abnormal return around the announcement of dividend change (CAR 3) is negative for 
decreasers (−1.4%) and positive for small increasers (0.4%) and large increasers (0.6%). Median 
values exhibit similar patterns. These results are consistent with the idea that firm value is 
positively related to changes in dividends.  
 
[Insert Table 1] 
 
Average abnormal accruals (RACCR) equal −0.029 for decreasers, and −0.042 and 
−0.043 for small and large increasers. The earnings-management-based explanation for this 
finding is that dividend increasers engage in more downward management of income. The 
performance-based interpretation of the difference in abnormal accruals is that dividend 
increasers are stronger performers and hold lower amounts of working capital, resulting in lower 
actual accruals. Therefore, their abnormal accruals, i.e., actual – expected, will be more negative. 
The multiperiod evidence reported in Table 3 and discussed below is consistent with the latter 
interpretation. 
Mean abnormal SG&A expense (RSG) equals 0.005 for decreasers, and 0.042 and 0.036 
for small and large increasers, which suggests more apparent upward management of income by 
firms increasing dividends through decreasing SG&A expense. The performance-based 
interpretation of the difference in RSG is that firms increasing dividends are stronger performers 
(i.e., they are more efficient), yielding a higher profit margin or turnover (sales/assets) on their 
investments in R&D, advertising and capital expenditures. The same conclusion can be reached 
from the results on production and total real-activities-based earnings management (RPROD and 
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REM — the sum of RSG and RPROD). Mean RPROD equals -0.081 for decreasers, but only -
0.051 and -0.057 for small and large increasers; REM equals −0.076 for dividend decreasers, but 
only −0.008 and −0.020 for small and large increasers. This suggests lower downward earnings 
management through production and total real activities by high-performing firms. The 
performance-based explanation is that dividend increasers enjoy higher efficiency in production 
perhaps due to accelerated expenditures on R&D and capital expenditures (the mean year-over-
year percentage change in capital expenditures for dividend decreasers is −2.1%, and that for 
small and large dividend increasers are +11.7% and +16.5%).  
Table 1 also shows that the mean and median M/B ratios increase monotonically across 
the three subsamples, which is consistent with the idea that investors perceive better performance 
trajectory for firms that increase dividends by greater amounts compared with firms that decrease 
dividends. Dividend-increasing firms also use a greater percentage of incentive-based 
compensation, which would be a rational decision for both the boards and managers of higher-
performing firms.  
We next establish that dividend change events reveal information regarding multiperiod 
firm performance. Panels A-F of Table 2 report the cumulative compound percentage change in 
total revenue, income before extraordinary items, dividends per share, cash flow from operations 
capital expenditures, and SG&A expense from years −3 to +3 relative to each dividend change 
announcement. We find that firms announcing the most positive (negative) percentage change in 
dividends at time zero are on the highest (lowest) performance trajectories, as evidenced by 
faster (slower) growth in revenues, profits, dividends, cash flows, capital expenditures and 
SG&A. These findings are consistent with the idea that dividend change events reveal 
information regarding multiperiod firm performance across a variety of dimensions.  
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[Insert Table 2] 
 
We extend our univariate analysis by examining real and accruals-based earnings 
management metrics spanning years −3 to +3 relative to the dividend change announcement. 
Panels A-D of Table 3 report the year-by-year median RACCR, RSG, RPROD and REM for the 
three groups of dividend-payers. Panel A (RACCR) shows that firms that increase dividends in 
year zero appear to engage in more downward earnings management than dividend decreasers in 
every year. This finding is not consistent with the multiperiod reversal in accrual-based earnings 
management activities predicted by previous research, nor is it consistent with the "big bath" or 
"cookie jar" explanation. It is, however, consistent with the view that dividend increasing firms 
are on stronger performance trajectories (as shown in Table 2). Holding lower working capital 
allows these firms to direct a greater percentage of the firm's resources into capital assets, based 
on the expectation that higher levels of investment will yield higher payoffs. 
 
[Insert Table 3] 
 
Panel B of Table 3 reports year-by-year median abnormal SG&A expense (RSG) for the 
three groups of dividend payers. Firms increasing dividends appear to engage in more upward 
management of earnings through SG&A expense over years −3 to +3 compared with firms that 
decrease dividends. A straightforward explanation for this finding is that high-performing firms 
(increasers) have more efficient operations than their subindustry peer groups. 
Panel C of Table 3 reports year-by-year median abnormal production cost (RPROD), 
which is the second component of real activities-based earnings management. Although there is 
virtually no difference in the median RPROD of the three groups, it is noteworthy that no 
multiperiod reversal or big bath/cookie jar effects are present. 
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Panel D of Table 3 reports total real earnings management (REM), which is the sum of 
RSG and RPROD. As there was virtually no difference in the RPROD of the three groups, the 
differences in REM are largely driven by the differences in RSG reported in Panel B. We see that 
the REM of dividend increasers is consistently greater than that of the dividend-decreasing 
subsample in years −3 to +3, consistent with the idea that high-performance firms with superior 
prospects spend more on capital assets. 
4.1 Multivariate Analysis of Earnings Management Metrics and Firm Performance 
The evidence presented in Tables 1-3 provides some support for the ideas that dividend 
changes reveal information regarding multiperiod firm performance, and that conventional 
earnings management metrics are influenced by differences in the performance trajectory of 
firms within their subindustry classifications. We next test our first formal hypothesis using the 
regression model shown as Equation (4), namely that standard measures of earnings management 
will have a stronger statistical relation with multiperiod firm performance (measured as the 
percentage change in a firm's annual dividend) than with unexpected earnings, which are the 
supposed targets of firms' smoothing activities. Results are shown in Table 4, using the earnings 
management metrics RACCR, RSG, RPROD and REM as the dependent variables in Models 1-4, 
respectively. The key variables of interest are % ch. Div and Earnings Surprise. 
 
[Insert Table 4] 
 
In Model 1, which uses RACCR (abnormal total accruals) as the dependent variable, the 
regression coefficients on both the % ch. Div and Earnings Surprise variables are statistically 
insignificant at conventional levels. These results are consistent with He, et al. (2017), who find 
that dividend-paying firms are less likely to engage in accruals-based earnings management than 
non-payers. Models 2-4 use the real activities-based earnings management metrics RSG, RPROD 
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and REM, respectively, as the dependent variables. In each of these models, the coefficient on   
% ch. Div is positive and statistically significant at either the 1% or 5% level, and the Earnings 
Surprise variable is insignificant. These findings support our first hypothesis, namely that 
conventional earnings management metrics reveal information about multiperiod firm 
performance — at least for real activities-based measures — rather than the unexpected earnings 
at which firms' smoothing activities are targeted. 
The positive relation between the real activities-based earnings management metrics and 
dividend changes does not indicate that firms are engaging in more upwards earnings 
management in order to increase dividends. Recall that firms reporting the largest increases in 
dividends are also better performers (Table 2). If earnings were being managed upward to justify 
larger dividend increases, we would expect firms to reduce, rather than accelerate, capital and 
SG&A expenditures. 
We next present a test of our second hypothesis, which proposes that firms that appear to 
engage in earnings management to a greater degree are actually stronger performers, and thus are 
more likely to increase their dividends. We test this hypothesis using logistic regression 
(Equation 5) to model the probability that a firm will increase its dividend as a function of 
various earnings management metrics and earnings surprise, controlling for the same factors as 
in the earnings management regressions described above. The results are reported in Table 5. 
The coefficients on all the real earnings management metrics (Models 2-4) are positive and 
significantly different from zero at the 1% level, while those for Earnings Surprise are not 
significantly different from zero. This indicates that firms that appear to engage in more earnings 
management via real activities — or firms on high-performance trajectories — are more likely to 
increase their dividends. The % ch. Capital Spending variable is also significant in Models 1-4, 
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which supports the latter idea that firms that increase their dividends are actually stronger 
performers and not earnings manipulators. Abnormal total accruals (RACCR) is not significantly 
related to the odds of increase in dividends. 
 
[Insert Table 5] 
 
Each estimated coefficient in a logistic regression model in Table 5 measures the effect of 
a one-unit change in the corresponding variable on the logarithm of the odds ratios (𝑙𝑛 # $%&$') 
that a firm will increase its dividend, holding all other variables in that model constant. Table 6 
presents the change in the odds ratios # $%&$' and in probabilities ( p) as a result of a one-unit 
change in the corresponding variable.  
 
[Insert Table 6] 
 
In Model 1, the odds ratio (probability) for RACCR equals 0.1239 (.110), indicating that a 
one-unit increase in RACCR increases the odds (probability) of a dividend increase by 0.12 
(11%). This finding is consistent with the idea that accrual-based earnings management is not 
significantly related to dividends change decisions. By contrast, a one unit change in RSG, 
RPROD, or REM increases the odds (probability) of an increase in dividends by much greater 
amounts, ranging from 2.92 to 7.37 (74.5% to 88.1%). This finding supports the idea that high-
performance firms that invest and spend more are also more likely to increase dividends. 
Our third hypothesis states that stock returns around dividend announcement dates will 
have a stronger relation with the dividend change performance signal (i.e., performance 
trajectory) than standard measures of earnings management associated with firms' efforts to 
smooth earnings and dividends and achieve their EPS and DPS targets. We test this hypothesis 
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by regressing the three-day cumulative abnormal return around the dividend change 
announcement date on each earnings management measure, the percentage change in dividends 
per share, and the control variables described above. The results are reported in Table 7. We find 
a positive and significant relation between the announcement period return and the percentage 
change in dividends in each model. The coefficients of abnormal accruals (Model 1) and all the 
real earnings management metrics (Models 2-4) are insignificant. The results confirm the well-
established view that changes in dividends convey information to investors. They further indicate 
that the activities used to smooth earnings and dividends, typically classified as earnings 
management, convey less value-relevant information to investors compared with the degree to 
which dividend-paying firms are able (or find it necessary) to change their dividend level. These 
results suggest investors focus more on firms' multiperiod performance trajectories than the 
smoothing activities that contributed to the firm's ability (or necessity) to change the dividend. 
 
[Insert Table 7] 
5. Summary and Conclusions 
We argue that the frequency with which firms engage in opportunistic earnings 
management is overstated in the academic literature due to a variety of factors. Among these are 
the competing imperatives to report smooth streams of high quality earnings over time while 
adhering to the principle of faithful representation; the tendency to measure earnings 
management as a single-period activity; and the failure of standard earnings management metrics 
to fully account for multiperiod firm performance. 
We propose that "abnormal" levels of discretionary accruals and real activities reflect 
more information about cross-sectional differences in the performance trajectories of firms 
within their subindustry classifications than about active attempts to manage earnings. We test 
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our proposition using dividend change as a natural setting that involves a multiobjective and 
multiperiod decision and that distinguishes high from low performance trajectory firms. Survey 
evidence suggests that earnings and dividends are managed (or smoothed) jointly, mainly by 
adjustments to real activities across fiscal periods (Graham, et. al, 2005 and Brav, et. al, 2005). 
This implies both multiobjective and multiperiod effects and a relation with firm performance. 
We first establish that dividend changes indeed reflect information regarding firms' 
multiperiod performance by sorting our sample of firms into three groups based on the 
percentage change in dividends (large increasers, small increasers and decreasers) and examining 
changes/growth in revenues, profits, dividends, cash flows, and capital and SG&A expenditures, 
over years −3 to +3 relative to the dividend change announcement. We find that firms 
announcing the most positive (negative) percentage change in dividends at time zero are on the 
highest (lowest) performance trajectory (spanning), as evidenced by faster (slower) growth in 
revenues, profits, dividends, cash flows, and capital and SG&A expenditures. These findings 
provide comfort in using the percentage change in dividends announced at time zero as a signal 
of firm performance trajectory throughout our study. 
We then calculate the standard accruals and real-activities earnings management metrics 
for the three groups of firms and find that small and large increasers exhibit lower abnormal 
accruals and higher abnormal SG&A and total real earnings management. We attribute the 
results to differences in firms’ performance trajectories. In particular, because dividend 
increasers are stronger performers (i.e., because they are more efficient), they hold lower 
amounts of working capital, resulting in lower actual accruals and thus lower abnormal accruals. 
These firms also yield a higher profit margin or turnover (sales/assets) on their investments, 
resulting in lower actual SG&A and thus higher abnormal SG&A and total real earnings 
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management. Our findings are not consistent with the explanation that firms engage in more 
upwards earnings management to justify larger dividend increases or to avoid dividend cut. 
Firms that raise dividends by the greatest amount also have the highest growth in capital 
expenditures and SG&A. If earnings were being managed higher to justify larger dividend 
increases, we would expect firms to delay, rather than accelerate, the pace at which they are 
spending on real activities. 
We model various real and accruals-based earnings management metrics as a function of 
firms' most recent dividend change and earnings surprise, controlling for factors thought to affect 
firms' incentives to manage earnings and for differences in the life-cycle and financial 
characteristics of dividend-paying firms. We find that standard measures of earnings 
management based on real activities are positively related to the dividend change performance 
signal, but unrelated to the unexpected earnings at which firms' smoothing activities are 
supposedly targeted. These results support the idea that the earnings management metrics reveal 
more information about firm performance trajectory than about active attempts to manage 
earnings.  
Next, we model the probability that a firm will increase its dividend as a function of 
earnings management metrics and earnings surprises, controlling for the same variables as in the 
above regressions. We find that firms that have higher growth in capital expenditures — which 
would be expected from firms on high-performance trajectories — are more likely to increase 
their dividends. The unexpected earnings at which firms' smoothing activities are supposedly 
targeted are not significantly related to the likelihood of a dividend increase. These results 
provide further support for the idea that standard earnings management metrics reflect more 
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information about companies' performance trajectory and their ability to increase (or need to 
decrease) dividends. 
Finally, we test whether stock returns around dividend announcement dates have a 
stronger relation with the dividend change performance signal than standard measures of 
earnings management. We regress the three-day cumulative abnormal return around the dividend 
change announcement on various earnings management metrics, the percentage change in 
dividends per share, and various financial and firm life-cycle control variables. The 
announcement period return is positively related to the percentage change in dividends in each 
model; all earnings management metrics are insignificant. These results suggest investors focus 
more on firms' multiperiod performance than the smoothing activities that contributed to the 
firm's ability (or requirement) to change the dividend. 
Our findings provide a useful guide for possible reinterpretation of the results of 
numerous earnings management studies. For example, Kothari, Mizik and Roychowdhury (2016) 
find that firms that engage in the most downward manipulation of R&D and SG&A to overstate 
earnings at the time of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) have the largest negative return 
reversals in subsequent years. Of course, firms that raise capital via SEOs are thought to be 
poorer long-term performers overall (Jegadeesh, 2000). An alternative interpretation of Kothari, 
et al.'s (2016) findings is that firms with less promising prospects are more likely to reduce 
spending on R&D and SG&A by greater amounts due to performance-related factors. Consistent 
with their poorer prospects, the long-term returns of these firms are also lower than firms that do 
not need to reduce spending on R&D and SG&A as drastically. Future research is likely to 
continue investigating the relation between firm performance and standard earnings management 
metrics, and in particular, whether our findings generalize to all firms, including those that do not 
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pay dividends. Clearly, a measure of performance trajectory other than dividend change needs to 
be developed for non-dividend paying firms. 
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions. 
% ch. Div Percentage change in ANNODIV, = 100 * (ANNODIV t – ANNODIV t-1) / ANNODIV t-1 
ANNODIV Annual ordinary dividends per share 
CAR3 
Three-day cumulative abnormal returns around the dividend change declaration date (days 
-1 to 1); individual firm returns are market adjusted by subtracting the return from the 
CRSP value-weighted index on the same day 
CFO Cash flow from operations 
Change in 
CAPEX 
The percentage change in capital expenditures over the 12 months preceding the dividend 
announcement date 
Change in CFO 
The percentage change in operating cash flows over 12 months preceding the dividend 
announcement date 
COMP Incentive pay, = total compensation less salary as a percentage of total compensation 
Earnings Surprise 
(Actual earnings per share as reported by I/B/E/S – median of the most recent analysts' 
consensus forecast before the earnings release date) / absolute value of actual earnings per 
share 
IBEI Income before extraordinary items  
INSTOWN 
Institutional ownership, = total institutional ownership as a percentage of shares 
outstanding 
LEV  Leverage, = Total debt t-1 / Assets t-1 
LN (age) 
Firm age, = Natural logarithm of the age of the firm as of year t, where age is the 
difference between year t and the first year in which the firm appears in the Compustat 
database 
M/B Market value of common equity t-1/ book value of common equity t-1 
PAYCH Dividend increase indicator/dummy, = 1 if % ch. Div is positive, and 0 otherwise 
PPE Property, plant and equipment 
PROD Production costs, = cost of goods sold + change in inventory 
RACCR 
Abnormal total accruals, = Residual from the following regression for each two-digit SIC 
industry per year: 
 
REM Total real earnings management, = RSG + RPROD 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 0 1 1 1
2 1 3 1
1t t t t t
t t t t t
TA Assets Assets Sales Assets
PPE Assets IBEI Assets
a a
a a e
- - -
- -
= + D +
+ +
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RPROD 
Abnormal production costs, = Residual from the following regression for each two-digit 
SIC industry per year: 
 
RSG 
Abnormal discretionary expenditures, = Residual from the following regression for each 
two-digit SIC industry per year multiplied by -1: 
 
SG&A Selling, general and administrative expenses 
SIZE Firm size, = Natural logarithm of market value of common equity t-1 
TA Total accruals, = IBEI – CFO 
  
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 0 1 1 1
2 1 3 1 1
1t t t t t
t t t t t
PROD Assets Assets Sales Assets
Sales Assets Sales Assets
a a
a a e
- - -
- - -
= + +
D + D +
( ) ( )1 0 1 1 1 11t t t t t tSGA Assets Assets Sales Assetsa a e- - - -= + +
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics. This table reports descriptive statistics for a sample of firms that changed their 
dividend payment from 1994-2013. The sample includes all publicly-traded firms in Compustat’s ExecuComp 
database that have paid dividends in the current and prior year, and for which the following data are available: 
institutional ownership in GMI database, dividends and stock returns in CRSP database, and analyst forecasts in 
I/B/E/S database. Firms in regulated industries (utilities and financial institutions) are excluded, as are firm-years 
with less than eight observations in each two-digit SIC industry in each year. We control for outliers by deleting 
firm-years with compensation and institutional ownership at the extreme 99th percentile levels and all the other 
variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles of their respective distributions. Firms are sorted into 3 groups: dividend 
decreasers and firms that increase dividends by larger (smaller) amounts, measured as firms with percentage 
changes in dividends above (below) the industry median for all firms increasing dividends. Variables are defined 
in Appendix A. 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics, Full Sample 
Variable N Mean 25th Pctl Median 75th Pctl Std Dev 
CAR3 2581 0.003  -0.016  0.002  0.020  0.036  
RACCR 2581 -0.037  -0.068  -0.032  0.002  0.060  
RSG 2581 0.040  -0.043  0.029  0.116  0.154  
RPROD 2581 -0.039  -0.145  -0.041  0.054  0.174  
REM 2581 0.001  -0.181  -0.009  0.156  0.313  
% ch. Div 2581 1.877  0.000  1.174  3.226  5.239  
Earnings Surprise 2581 0.001  -0.005  0.007  0.026  0.146  
% ch. Cash Flow 2581 18.048  -15.212  5.969  31.859  79.003  
% ch. CAPEX 2581 12.759  -12.804  7.826  30.364  42.105  
SIZE 2581 7.814  6.769  7.757  8.803  1.390  
LEV 2581 0.215  0.122  0.215  0.306  0.132  
COMP 2581 38.567  20.635  38.009  56.819  23.282  
INSTOWN 2581 0.696  0.599  0.716  0.818  0.165  
M/B 2581 3.147  1.754  2.470  3.594  2.770  
LN(age) 2581 3.422  3.091  3.611  3.871  0.607  
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Table 1 (continued).  
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics, Firms Decreasing Dividends 
Variable N Mean 25th Pctl Median 75th Pctl Std Dev 
CAR3 99 -0.014  -0.039  -0.007  0.011  0.045  
RACCR 99 -0.029  -0.058  -0.023  0.009  0.065  
RSG 99 0.005  -0.073  0.012  0.074  0.140  
RPROD 99 -0.081  -0.162  -0.061  0.020  0.166  
REM 99 -0.076  -0.214  -0.055  0.081  0.290  
% ch. Div 99 -17.961  -21.739  -16.912  -12.500  11.133  
Earnings Surprise 99 -0.002  -0.033  0.003  0.037  0.157  
% ch. Cash Flow 99 17.857  -30.624  5.242  28.330  121.531  
% ch. CAPEX 99 -2.048  -29.146  -5.333  18.096  38.669  
SIZE 99 7.508  6.621  7.366  8.401  1.340  
LEV 99 0.242  0.128  0.261  0.361  0.150  
COMP 99 33.177  7.667  30.594  52.288  25.984  
INSTOWN 99 0.630  0.509  0.654  0.751  0.182  
M/B 99 2.858  1.374  2.140  3.695  2.126  
LN(age) 99 3.504  3.296  3.664  3.912  0.553  
 
Panel C: Descriptive Statistics, Firms Increasing Dividends by Smaller Percentage Amounts 
Variable N Mean 25th Pctl Median 75th Pctl Std Dev 
CAR3 1060 0.004  -0.012  0.003  0.020  0.032  
RACCR 1060 -0.042  -0.073  -0.032  -0.006  0.056  
RSG 1060 0.042  -0.051  0.026  0.123  0.158  
RPROD 1060 -0.051  -0.158  -0.062  0.046  0.172  
REM 1060 -0.008  -0.200  -0.028  0.161  0.316  
% ch. Div 1060 1.952  1.064  1.754  2.558  1.170  
Earnings Surprise 1060 0.001  -0.003  0.006  0.019  0.084  
% ch. Cash Flow 1060 15.739  -11.850  6.120  28.258  61.896  
% ch. CAPEX 1060 11.741  -9.562  8.226  27.876  34.202  
SIZE 1060 8.167  7.220  8.024  9.028  1.288  
LEV 1060 0.208  0.126  0.216  0.291  0.122  
COMP 1060 41.118  23.550  41.075  59.498  22.814  
INSTOWN 1060 0.685  0.604  0.695  0.784  0.150  
M/B 1060 3.363  2.047  2.776  3.948  2.204  
LN(age) 1060 3.595  3.466  3.784  3.912  0.502  
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Table 1 (continued). 
Panel D: Descriptive Statistics, Firms Increasing Dividends by Larger Percentage Amounts 
Variable N Mean 25th Pctl Median 75th Pctl Std Dev 
CAR3 1422 0.006  -0.013  0.004  0.022  0.034  
RACCR 1422 -0.043  -0.076  -0.035  -0.004  0.062  
RSG 1422 0.036  -0.051  0.020  0.110  0.156  
RPROD 1422 -0.057  -0.166  -0.068  0.034  0.178  
REM 1422 -0.020  -0.209  -0.047  0.133  0.317  
% ch. Div 1422 5.440  2.778  4.167  6.140  5.358  
Earnings Surprise 1422 0.006  -0.002  0.007  0.020  0.060  
% ch. Cash Flow 1422 17.555  -9.058  8.237  30.182  70.532  
% ch. CAPEX 1422 16.532  -7.919  11.881  33.371  41.007  
SIZE 1422 8.078  7.042  8.072  9.099  1.375  
LEV 1422 0.200  0.107  0.198  0.287  0.128  
COMP 1422 40.274  23.194  39.798  58.381  23.119  
INSTOWN 1422 0.692  0.587  0.713  0.816  0.164  
M/B 1422 3.515  2.062  2.846  3.982  2.662  
LN(age) 1422 3.380  2.996  3.555  3.850  0.603  
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Table 2: Firm Performance Pre- and  
Post-Dividend Change. This table reports the 
cumulative compound rate of change of six firm 
performance metrics from years -3 to +3 relative to 
the year in which each dividend change event is 
announced. Firms are partitioned into 3 groups: 
dividend decreasers, small increasers, and large 
increasers. Large (small) increasers are firms with 
percentage changes in dividends above (below) the 
industry median for all firms increasing dividends.  
 
 
Panel A: 
Change in Total Revenue 
  Small Large 
Period Decreasers Increasers Increasers 
-3 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
-2 3.4% 6.8% 9.0% 
-1 3.7% 14.2% 18.5% 
0 3.2% 22.0% 27.9% 
+1 7.4% 29.8% 36.9% 
+2 14.3% 37.7% 45.7% 
+3 19.9% 45.5% 55.0% 
 
 
Panel B: 
Change in Income Before Extraordinary Items 
  Small Large 
Year Decreasers Increasers Increasers 
-3 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
-2 -8.4% 10.9% 16.9% 
-1 -24.8% 22.1% 34.7% 
0 -30.1% 33.7% 50.2% 
+1 -16.7% 45.9% 62.4% 
+2 -0.8% 59.6% 78.3% 
+3 7.2% 74.2% 95.6% 
 
 
Panel C: 
Change in Dividends Per Share 
  Small Large 
Year Decreasers Increasers Increasers 
-3 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
-2 2.6% 6.1% 10.5% 
-1 2.6% 12.7% 24.4% 
0 -23.1% 19.3% 43.8% 
+1 -23.1% 26.6% 61.8% 
+2 -23.1% 34.3% 79.2% 
+3 -19.7% 42.4% 95.8% 
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Table 2 (continued). 
 
 
Panel D: 
Change in Cash Flow 
  Small Large 
Year Decreasers Increasers Increasers 
-3 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
-2 -4.1% 4.1% 10.0% 
-1 -11.8% 10.3% 21.0% 
0 -8.5% 17.6% 28.9% 
+1 -11.9% 26.1% 38.7% 
+2 -13.4% 32.6% 49.0% 
+3 -8.5% 38.2% 58.0% 
 
 
Panel E: 
Change in Capital Expenditures 
  Small Large 
Year Decreasers Increasers Increasers 
-3 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
-2 2.4% 7.4% 10.3% 
-1 0.1% 16.3% 22.8% 
0 -5.3% 25.9% 36.6% 
+1 -2.0% 34.8% 48.1% 
+2 7.4% 43.7% 55.8% 
+3 14.0% 49.3% 63.3% 
 
 
 
 
Panel F: 
Change in SG&A Expense 
  Small Large 
Year Decreasers Increasers Increasers 
-3 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
-2 2.5% 0.4% 0.1% 
-1 5.2% -0.3% 0.3% 
0 6.7% 6.6% 7.9% 
+1 10.2% 13.4% 15.8% 
+2 9.3% 13.0% 15.5% 
+3 9.5% 13.2% 15.4% 
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Table 3: Earnings Management Pre- and 
Post-Dividend Change. This tables reports the 
median of various earnings management measures 
from years -3 to +3 relative to the year in which each 
dividend change event is announced. Firms are 
partitioned into 3 groups: dividend decreasers, small 
increasers, and large increasers. Large (small) 
increasers are firms with percentage changes in 
dividends above (below) the industry median for all 
firms increasing dividends. Variables are defined in 
Appendix A. 
Panel A: 
Median Total Abnormal Accruals (RACCR) 
  Small Large 
Period Decreasers Increasers Increasers 
-3 -2.17% -3.63% -3.37% 
-2 -1.92% -3.24% -3.59% 
-1 -1.14% -3.21% -3.60% 
0 -2.36% -3.23% -3.54% 
+1 -1.94% -3.53% -3.56% 
+2 -2.08% -3.63% -3.68% 
+3 -2.31% -3.70% -3.94% 
 
 
 
Panel B: 
Median Abnormal SG&A Expense (RSG) 
  Small Large 
Year Decreasers Increasers Increasers 
-3 0.33% 2.24% 1.41% 
-2 0.73% 2.19% 1.87% 
-1 -0.45% 2.34% 1.91% 
0 1.16% 2.57% 2.02% 
+1 0.11% 2.73% 1.90% 
+2 0.39% 2.71% 2.31% 
+3 1.07% 2.69% 2.43% 
 
 
 
Panel C: 
Median Abnormal Production Expense (RPROD) 
  Small Large 
Year Decreasers Increasers Increasers 
-3 -9.03% -6.26% -6.32% 
-2 -8.53% -6.89% -6.97% 
-1 -6.07% -6.57% -6.88% 
0 -6.10% -6.23% -6.81% 
+1 -6.23% -6.60% -6.76% 
+2 -6.82% -6.41% -6.65% 
+3 -5.71% -6.52% -6.66% 
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Table 3 (continued). 
 
 
Panel D: 
Median Total Real Earnings Management (REM) 
  Small Large 
Year Decreasers Increasers Increasers 
-3 -5.07% -3.78% -4.87% 
-2 -6.34% -4.22% -4.56% 
-1 -5.99% -3.56% -4.95% 
0 -5.52% -2.81% -4.67% 
+1 -6.96% -3.07% -4.26% 
+2 -8.19% -3.05% -4.00% 
+3 -3.23% -3.30% -3.00% 
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Table 4: Regressions of earnings management metrics on dividend change and control variables. This table 
reports the results of cross-sectional regressions of various earnings management metrics on the percentage change in a firm's 
annual dividend per share (% ch. Div), the firm's most recent earnings surprise, and control variables: 
 
  
 
The earnings management metrics – RACCR (abnormal accruals), RSG (abnormal discretionary expenditures), RPROD 
(abnormal production costs) and REM (total real earnings management) – are the dependent variables in regression models 1-
4. All variables are defined in Appendix A. Regression coefficients for variables significant at conventional levels (1% or 
5%) appear in bold. 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variable RACCR RSG RPROD REM 
Intercept 0.0013 0.0083 -0.0500 -0.0417 
t-statistic 0.13 0.34 -1.83 -0.85 
% ch. Dividend -0.0001 0.0014 0.0011 0.0025 
t-statistic -0.74 3.06 2.20 2.71 
Earnings Surprise 0.0038 0.0123 -0.0265 -0.0142 
t-statistic 0.29 0.42 -0.74 -0.23 
% ch. Cash Flow -0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
t-statistic -5.10 0.69 -0.20 0.30 
% ch. Capital Spending 0.0000 -0.0002 0.0001 -0.0001 
t-statistic 1.43 -1.80 1.01 -0.46 
SIZE -0.0045 -0.0037 -0.0091 -0.0128 
t-statistic -4.23 -1.28 -2.67 -2.14 
LEV 0.0352 0.0073 0.0932 0.1005 
t-statistic 3.98 0.32 3.76 2.23 
COMP -0.0003 0.0002 0.0001 0.0003 
t-statistic -6.26 1.41 0.32 0.88 
INSTOWN -0.0170 0.0590 0.0582 0.1171 
t-statistic -2.33 2.78 2.60 2.81 
M/B -0.0039 -0.0109 -0.0232 -0.0341 
t-statistic -6.15 -7.37 -10.34 -9.58 
LN(age) 0.0077 0.0126 0.0237 0.0363 
t-statistic 3.57 2.23 3.90 3.24 
N 2581 2581 2581 2581 
R-Squared 11.2% 4.7% 13.5% 9.3% 
Adjusted R-Squared 10.7% 4.3% 13.1% 8.9% 
 
( )
0 1 2 3
4 5 6 7 8 9 10
. % .EarningsMngt Proxy ch Div Earnings Surprise Change in CFO
Change in Capital Spending SIZE LEV COMP INSTOWN M B LN age
b b b b
b b b b b b b e
= + + + +
+ + + + + + +
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Table 5: Logistic regressions estimating the probability that a firm will increase dividends. This table reports 
the results of logistic regressions estimating the probability that a firm will increase its dividend (PAYCH = 1) as a function 
of earnings management metrics, the firm's most recent earnings surprise, and control variables:  
 
   
 
RACCR (abnormal total accruals), RSG (abnormal discretionary expenditures), RPROD (abnormal production costs) and REM 
(total real earnings management) are the earnings management metrics in models 1-4. All variables are defined in Appendix 
A. Regression coefficients for variables significant at conventional levels (1% or 5%) appear in bold. 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variable RACCR RSG RPROD REM 
Intercept 1.2173 1.2831 1.4188 1.3629 
p-value 0.158 0.143 0.108 0.122 
Earnings Mngt. metric -2.0885 1.9293 1.9973 1.0724 
p-value 0.302 0.008 0.005 0.004 
Earnings Surprise 0.4527 0.4604 0.5111 0.4927 
p-value 0.630 0.627 0.592 0.605 
% ch. Cash Flow -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0002 0.0000 
p-value 0.907 0.964 0.901 0.971 
% ch. Capital Spending 0.0135 0.0135 0.0128 0.0131 
p-value <.0001 <.0001 0.0001 <.0001 
SIZE 0.3201 0.3242 0.3364 0.3308 
p-value 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 
LEV -2.5321 -2.5757 -2.6963 -2.6462 
p-value 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 
COMP 0.0060 0.0069 0.0068 0.0069 
p-value 0.246 0.181 0.186 0.184 
INSTOWN 1.3339 1.2500 1.2430 1.2349 
p-value 0.047 0.064 0.066 0.068 
M/B 0.0586 0.0942 0.1273 0.1140 
p-value 0.346 0.148 0.066 0.091 
LN(age) -0.3924 -0.4352 -0.4705 -0.4567 
p-value 0.065 0.045 0.032 0.037 
N 2581 2581 2581 2581 
Wald Ratio 61.9 67.8 68.6 68.8 
   p-value <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
 
  
( )
( )
0 1 2
3 4
5 6 7 8
9 10
Prob 1 .PAYCH Earnings Mngt Earnings Surprise
Change in CFO Change in Capital Spending
SIZE LEV COMP INSTOWN
M B LN age
b b b
b b
b b b b
b b e
= = + + +
+ +
+ + + +
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Table 6: Odds ratios and probabilities from logistic regressions. This table reports the odds ratios (𝑂𝑅 = ,%&$) and 
probabilities (p) calculated based on the logit regressions shown as Equation 5 and reported in Table 5: 
 
   
 
RACCR (abnormal total accruals), RSG (abnormal discretionary expenditures), RPROD (abnormal production costs) and REM 
(total real earnings management) are the earnings management metrics in models 1-4. All variables are defined in Appendix 
A. Probabilities for variables significant at conventional levels from the estimation of Equation 5 (1% or 5%) appear in bold. 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variable RACCR RSG RPROD REM 
Earnings Mngt. metric 0.1239 6.8847 7.3691 2.9224 
Probability 0.110 0.873 0.881 0.745 
Earnings Surprise 1.573 1.5847 1.6671 1.6367 
Probability 0.6113 0.613 0.625 0.621 
% ch. Cash Flow 0.9999 0.9999 1.0002 1.0000 
Probability 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 
% ch. Capital Spending 1.0136 1.0136 1.0129 1.0132 
Probability 0.503 0.503 0.503 0.503 
SIZE 1.3773 1.3829 1.3999 1.3921 
Probability 0.579 0.580 0.583 0.582 
LEV 0.0795 0.0761 0.0675 0.0709 
Probability 0.074 0.071 0.063 0.066 
COMP 1.0060 1.0069 1.0069 1.0069 
Probability 0.502 0.502 0.502 0.502 
INSTOWN 3.7958 3.4903 3.4660 3.4380 
Probability 0.792 0.773 0.776 0.775 
M/B 1.0604 1.0988 1.1358 1.1208 
Probability 0.515 0.523 0.532 0.529 
LN(age) 0.6754 0.6471 0.6247 0.6333 
Probability 0.403 0.393 0.385 0.388 
N 2581 2581 2581 2581 
 
 
  
( )
( )
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3 4
5 6 7 8
9 10
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M B LN age
b b b
b b
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Table 7: This table reports the results of cross-sectional regressions of the three-day cumulative abnormal returns around 
the dividend change announcement date (days -1 to +1) on each earnings management metric, the percentage change in firms' 
annual dividend per share (% ch. Div) and control variables.  
 
  
 
RACCR (abnormal total accruals), RSG (abnormal discretionary expenditures), RPROD (abnormal production costs) and REM 
(total real earnings management) are the earnings management metrics in models 1-4. All variables are defined in Appendix 
A. Regression coefficients for variables significant at conventional levels (1% or 5%) appear in bold. 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variable RACCR RSG RPROD REM 
Intercept 0.0040 0.0040 0.0043 0.0041 
t-statistic 0.71 0.71 0.76 0.73 
% ch. Dividend 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 
t-statistic 3.14 3.08 3.08 3.07 
Earnings Mngt. metric 0.0006 0.0035 0.0054 0.0025 
t-statistic 0.05 0.79 1.34 1.13 
% ch. Cash Flow 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
t-statistic 1.11 1.12 1.13 1.12 
% ch. Capital Spending 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
t-statistic 1.03 1.06 1.00 1.04 
SIZE 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 
t-statistic 0.56 0.58 0.64 0.61 
LEV -0.0094 -0.0095 -0.0099 -0.0097 
t-statistic -1.72 -1.73 -1.82 -1.77 
COMP 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
t-statistic 1.4 1.42 1.4 1.39 
INSTOWN -0.0047 -0.0049 -0.0050 -0.0050 
t-statistic -1.02 -1.06 -1.09 -1.08 
M/B 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 
t-statistic 0.74 0.87 1.13 1.01 
LN(age) -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0006 
t-statistic -0.38 -0.41 -0.47 -0.44 
N 2581 2581 2581 2581 
R-Squared 1.3% 1.3% 1.4% 1.3% 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.9% 0.9% 1.0% 1.0% 
 
( )
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